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Chapter 14
Private Epistemic Virtue, Public Vices:
Moral Responsibility in the Policy Sciences
Merel Lefevere and Eric Schliesser
Abstract In this chapter we address what we call “The-Everybody-Did-It” (TEDI)
Syndrome, a symptom for collective negligence. Our main thesis is that the
character of scientific communities can be evaluated morally and be found wanting
in terms of moral responsibility. Even an epistemically successful scientific com-
munity can be morally responsible for consequences that were unforeseen by it and
its members and that follow from policy advice given by its individual members.
We motivate our account by a critical discussion of a recent proposal by Heather
Douglas. We offer three, related criticisms of Douglas’s account. First, she assumes
that scientific fields are communicative communities. Second, in a system where
the scientific community autonomously sets standards, there is a danger of self-
affirming reasoning. Third, she ignores that the character of a scientific community
is subject to moral evaluation. We argue that these omissions in Douglas’s theory
leave it with no adequate response to TEDI Syndrome. Moreover, we deny that
science ought to be characterized by unanimity of belief among its competent
practitioners, this leads easily to the vices of close-mindedness and expert-
overconfidence. If a scientific community wishes to avoid these vices it should
create conditions for an active pluralism when it and its members aspire to the
position of rational policy decision-making.
14.1 Introduction
In this chapter we provide a new approach to analyze the moral responsibility and
duty of scientific communities and individual scientists in these, especially those
engaged in policy science. We motivate our account by a critical discussion of a
recent proposal by Heather Douglas. In particular, our approach addresses what we
call “The-Everybody-Did-It” (TEDI) Syndrome. Our main thesis is that the char-
acter of scientific communities can be evaluated morally and be found wanting in
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terms of moral responsibility. In particular we argue that even an epistemically
successful scientific community can be morally responsible for consequences that
were unforeseen by it and its members and that follow from policy advice given by
its individual members. We sketch what we call an active pluralism in order to give
content to the duties that follow from the character failure of scientific
communities.
In Sect. 14.2 we summarize Heather Douglas’s proposal and elucidate its
character. In Sect. 14.3.1 we offer three, related criticisms of Douglas’ account.
First, she assumes that scientific fields are communicative communities. Second, in
a system where the scientific community autonomously sets standards, there is
a danger of self-affirming reasoning. Third, she ignores that the character of a
scientific community is subject to moral evaluation. We argue that these omissions
in Douglas’s theory leave it with no adequate response to TEDI Syndrome. In a
fourth section we sketch an argument for the claim that if a scientific community
wishes to avoid the vices of close-mindedness and overconfidence it should create
conditions for an active pluralism when it and its members aspire to the position of
rational policy decision-making.
Before we turn to our argument, we offer one methodological comment and a
real-life (albeit stylized) example. We are primarily interested in recommendations
from policy scientists to policy makers and the public. Most of our examples focus
on economics, but our claims do not turn on these. However, the focus on econom-
ics is not only due to our scholarly interests; we argue that Douglas’s conception of
a scientific community has non-trivial similarities with an efficient market hypoth-
esis in economics.
So, what do we have in mind when we talk about TEDI syndrome? Our example
is grounded in a remarkable self-study of the Dutch Central Planning agency about
the gross failures in considering the possibility of the macro-economic conse-
quences (liquidity-trap, collapse in world-trade, etc.) of a Lehman style collapse
in 2008. The self-study repeatedly points to this failure in “all other forecast
agencies” (de Jong et al. 2010, p. 7, p. 27, p. 40, cf. p. 63). As the authors of the
study admit, at the time, their whole modeling approach is unable to think system-
atically about such events.1 We claim that the presence of TEDI syndrome is
evidence that one may be dealing with an instance of collective negligence.
14.2 Science: Responsible Scientists
In her increasingly influential book (2009) Science, Policy and the Value-Free
Ideal, Heather Douglas proposes that the longstanding idea of science as a value-
free ideal is not only mistaken but also undesirable. Here we focus only on the
1They treat the fall of Lehman as a discretionary policy choice (61) that cannot be modeled. For
more discussion of this case see Schliesser (2011).
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fourth chapter of her book, where Douglas offers an account of the moral respon-
sibilities of science. She argues that scientists need to consider the consequences of
error in their work, without expecting them to be fortune-tellers. However, we do
expect reasonable foresight and careful deliberation from scientists. This means
that scientists are accountable for expected results and for certain side-effects of
their actions. To elaborate on unforeseen consequences, Douglas returns to Joel
Feinberg’s well-known distinction between negligence and recklessness: “When
one knowingly creates an unreasonable risk to self or others, one is reckless; when
one unknowingly but faultily creates such a risk, one is negligent” (Feinberg 1970,
p. 193). Thus, according to Douglas, a reckless scientist is fully aware of unjustified
risks his choices entail, a negligent scientist is unaware of such risks, but he or she
should have been (Douglas 2009, p. 71).
But how does one determine a scientist’s negligence or recklessness? Difficulties
arise in determining how much foresight and deliberation we ought to expect from
scientists, without blaming them for every trivial use or misuse of their work.
According to Douglas scientific communities provide the benchmarks of responsi-
bility.2 Reasonable foresight is to be evaluated in light of the judgments of the
scientific community. While this still leaves a lot of details unanswered, Douglas
offers a quite plausible suggestion; non-scientists generally lack the technical
expertise to evaluate what would be foreseeable consequences of following policy
advice. Her position can be strengthened intuitively: for a clear way to
operationalize the very notion of expert-understanding of a scientific theory is to
know how to reliably derive consequences from it.
Before we turn to our criticism of Douglas’s approach, we provide some context
for it. In particular, we argue that Douglas leans towards a juridical interpretation of
scientific responsibility in terms of “what would a reasonable person do”?
14.2.1 The Reasonable Person
But how reasonable is that “reasonable person”? In current tort law and liability
cases a person is considered responsible for his actions, or his negligence or
imprudence. But the discussion about what is negligence and imprudence is still
going on. Before we apply this to a more serious example, let’s toy with this
situation:
It’s Monday morning, and as usual before work you pull over at your favorite
magazine shop. You hop out of your car, leave the engine running, and quickly pop
into the shop to pick up your journal. In the meantime a sinister figure approaches
your car, sees that it is unlocked, jumps in and drives of. A few hundred meters
further, the thief runs over a pedestrian.
2Douglas (2009), p. 83ff. Ian Hacking (1992) has developed a sophisticated treatment of the self-
vindicating norms of various scientific communities.
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Who’s to blame for the death of the pedestrian? The thief you say? Not so fast.
Are you not at least negligent or even reckless by not locking your car? Should you
not have foreseen the possibility that an unlocked car attracts thieves? Sure, it’s the
thief that pushed the gas pedal, but if you had locked your car, he would not have
stolen it and would not have hit the pedestrian. According to juridical standards,
you may be co-responsible for the accident (especially if your insurance company
has deep pockets), if a reasonable person would have acted in such a way that the
accident would not have happened. So if a reasonable person would have locked his
or her car, you may be, in part, to blame.
But who is that reasonable man (or woman) everyone should act like? The
reasonable person is a legal fiction; it represents an objective standard to measure
the actions of a real person against. While its philosophical roots may be traced
back to impartial spectator theories of Hume and Adam Smith, it was first intro-
duced into a legal context in 1837, in the case Vaughan versus Menlove. The
defendant built a haystack on his land, close to the border of the plaintiff’s land.
The haystack had a “chimney” to prevent the hay from spontaneous inflammation.
Unfortunately, the haystack caught fire anyway. However, the defendant had been
warned several times in 5 weeks’ time that the haystack was wrongly built, and thus
dangerous, but he would not change it. The hay caught fire, spread to the plaintiff’s
land, and two of his cottages were destroyed in the fire. The jury was asked to judge
whether the defendant’s showed such reasonable caution as a prudent man would
have acted with. This “reasonable person” test became a standard in the English and
U.S. courts.
Steven P. Scalet argues that this “reasonable person” functions like an empty
vessel, “allowing courts to use various norms and moral judgments to determine
what seems reasonable in the circumstances” (Scalet 2003, p. 75). The standard of
reasonableness is not very informative; it is the jury or the judges who interpret
“reasonable” along the lines of community norms, legal principles, precedents, or
moral judgments. This creates a serious tension. At one end, laws should be
formulated in general terms, so that they can be applied to a variety of particular
cases. At the other end, laws should provide the necessary information for citizens
in order to guide their behavior. Reasonableness can indeed be applied to particular
cases, but is no stable guide of conduct (ibid., p. 77). Scalet thinks of reasonable
standards as “binoculars that focus our attention on some actual practices that have
won our approval as an appropriate standard to guide our conduct” (ibid., p. 78).
This changes the direction of interpretation: it is no longer the fiction of the
reasonable man that instructs what is reasonable, but the behavior of actual people
with certain relevant traits. The question remains which traits are relevant and
which are not. There is a tendency in criminal law to individuate the characteristics
of the reasonable man, and have a certain tolerance for traits such as hot-headedness
or carelessness (ibid., p. 85). Others such as Honore´ (1988), Holmes (1881) and
Greenawalt (1992) argue for standards based on moral beliefs or other principles.
Once the court has set the relevant traits, the conduct of the defendant has to be
compared to the virtual or counterfactual conduct of the reasonable person. The
case-law reflects these divergent tendencies (Scalet 2003, p. 85 etseq). In American
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jurisprudence guidelines are being formulated by the American Law Institute to
give judges and lawyers information about general principles. For tort law there is
the Restatement of Torts.3 However in the legal literature those general principles
have come under critical scrutiny. For example, Bernstein (2001) claims that the
General Principles look at tort law from a gendered, mostly male, perspective.
Hetchers argues that in the Third Restatement of tort law the interpretation of
reasonableness is based on a normative characterization that transforms the reason-
able person standard into a tool for promoting social welfare, and thereby ignores
the moral heterogeneity of the community (Hetcher 2001).
For our purposes we need not take a stance on the debates over these general
principles. All we claim is that without a lot of further contextual detail mere appeal
to the legal framework of a “reasonable man” may not settle any interesting cases of
scientific responsibility.4 We now turn to a more critical engagement with Doug-
las’s framework.
14.2.2 The Reasonable Scientist
In this subsection we show that Douglas uses something like a “reasonable person”
framework to analyze responsibility in science. To argue for the responsibility of
scientists, Douglas critically analyzes Bridgman’s claim that “scientific freedom is
essential and that the artificial limitations of tools or subject matter are unthinkable”
(Bridgman 1947, p. 153). This means that scientists should have full autonomy and
should not be bothered with social or moral responsibilities beyond ordinary
responsibilities.
However, Douglas presents evidence that scientists do weigh epistemic goals
against other non-epistemic considerations: the use of human subjects in research,
animal rights, determining or cutting budgets for certain projects such as the
supercollider in the 1990s, etc.5 Douglas focuses on two particular cases in order
to show that scientists even act against the weak interpretation of Bridgman;
scientists frequently consider potential unintended outcomes of their research. For
example, she provides historical evidence that before testing the explosive chain
reaction of an atomic bomb, physicists worried that the energy that would come free
with the explosion of such a bomb may generate an unwanted chain reaction in the
earth’s atmosphere itself. Similarly, before pursuing recombinant DNA techniques,
3Restatement Third of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm (2010), Apportionment
of Liability (2000), and Products Liability (1998).
4Neil Levy reminded us that in the United States courts use the so-called Daubert and Frye tests in
evaluating admissibility of scientific facts and theories – both tests crucially make reference to
widespread acceptance within a scientific community. From our vantage point this makes the
question we are pursuing in the chapter only more urgent.
5Douglas 2009, p. 76. Of course, the requirements and incentives to take non-epistemic (e.g.,
legal, financial, ethical, etc.) factors into consideration may themselves be extra-scientific.
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scientists discussed the possible risks for public health and changed lab practices in
light of these. From these examples, Douglas infers that scientists themselves do not
consider themselves free of social or moral responsibilities.6 Of course, there are
wide disciplinary divergences in such matters. For example, not all scientific
professional societies have ethical codes or codes of conduct that govern their
members. Economics does not.7
In Douglas’s view scientific responsibility boils down to the duty to be neither
reckless nor negligent as a scientist. (Of course, she allows that scientists may have
all kinds of non-scientific responsibilities.) Even if we assume that scientists have
good intentions, there can be (i) unintended foreseeable consequences and
(ii) unintended unforeseeable consequences that may raise concern. But more
central for Douglas are (iii) “the potential unintended consequences of making
inaccurate or unreliable empirical claims” (Douglas 2009, p. 72). Externalizing the
responsibility for situations like (iii) beyond the scientific community, is an unlikely
option because “presumably only the scientist can fully appreciate the potential
implications of the work” (ibid., p. 73). The only qualified people who can consider
the potential errors and their consequences are often the scientists themselves.
Of course, we cannot expect scientists to be fortune-tellers. The responsibility
they bear should be limited by the standards of reasonable foresight. While she
discusses other cases, too, Douglas focuses on policy scientists (as will we). When
giving advice, scientists should consider the consequences of error and avoid
negligence or recklessness. “This means that when a scientist makes an empirical
claim in the process of advising, they should consider the potential consequences if
that claim is incorrect” (ibid., p. 81). A scientist should acknowledge uncertainties
in empirical evidence, but the weighing and listing of potential consequences is at
play in choosing to emphasize or minimize the importance of uncertainties.
As an aside: a note on our terminology: we deploy the old distinction between
measurable risk (with, say, a probability distribution attached to it) and
un-measurable uncertainty (Knight 1921; Keynes 1921). In practice, an event that
is not possible within a model-world – like the fall of Lehman for the Dutch CPB in
2008 – is uncertain. Both (ii) and (iii) may be uncertain.
But which consequences should a scientist be able to foresee? Here the standard
of reasonableness comes in. This standard should be provided by the scientific
communities: “because scientists work in such communities, in near constant
communication and competition with other scientists, what is foreseeable and
what is not can be readily determined” (Douglas 2009, p. 83). Douglas claims
that because a scientific community is essentially a communicative community,
6We leave aside to what degree this practice is itself a historic relic from a different scientific
culture or organization.
7 In private correspondence Heather Douglas pointed out that on her view “if there are scientific
groups without ethical codes or indeed any sense of responsibility for the consequences of error . . .
they are in moral error.”
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ideas of potential errors and their consequences will spread quickly and be
discussed.
Douglas illustrates this by an example from nuclear physics. The discovery of
the neutron by James Chadwick gave a boost to nuclear physics, but the discoveries
that followed the neutron did not have important implication outside of the disci-
pline. This changed when fission was discovered in 1938. In early 1939 scientists
saw the possibilities of fission in bomb making or energy production, which started
a political debate. But can we blame or praise Chadwick for the invention of the
atomic bomb or nuclear power? According to Douglas the scientific community in
early 1939 saw the potentially disturbing consequences of fission, and thus it is that
community that provides the benchmark of what should have been foreseen. In
Douglas’s words, “what is reasonable is to expect scientists to meet basic standards
of consideration and foresight that any person would share, with the reasonable
expectations of foresight judged against the scientist’s peer in the scientific com-
munity. [. . .] They are held to only what can be foreseen, and thus discussed and
considered.” (ibid., p. 84). Douglas’s case nicely shows that once a view about a
consequence reaches some threshold of wide currency within a scientific commu-
nity in a field, it becomes reasonable to presuppose it in one’s consideration of
reasonable foreseeable consequence, and – if needed – change one’s practices in
light of them.8Of course, one might think that there is some further responsibility to
conduct inquiry into whether there are relevant consequences. Below we argue that
there is indeed such a duty for a class of scientific agents.
Before we turn to our three, interconnected criticisms of Douglas, we should
note a qualification about our approach. According to adherents of the so-called
“doctrine of double-effect,” unintended consequences are never morally blame-
worthy. This doctrine states that “it is permissible to bring about as a merely
foreseen side effect a harmful event that it would be impermissible to bring about
intentionally.”9 The doctrine concerns circumscribing permissibility, but our views
concern what, among those things that are impermissible, is blameworthy; we
simply set it aside here.10
8This is a stricter standard than an appeal to what is to be found in textbooks, which are often
trailing scientific findings at the so-called “research frontier.” On the latter concept, see de Solla
Price (1965).
9McIntyre (2011). Of course, as she remarks, “traditional formulations of double effect require
that the value of promoting the good end outweigh the disvalue of the harmful side effect;” so it is
not a blanket principle.
10We thank Neil Levy for this formulation.
14 Private Epistemic Virtue, Public Vices 281
14.3 Collective Negligence and the “Everybody Did
It”-Syndrome
14.3.1 Three Criticisms of Douglas
In this section, we offer three, interconnected criticisms of Douglas: first, she
assumes that scientific fields are communicative communities in a way that begs
the question. Second, in a system where the scientific community autonomously
sets standards, there is a danger of self-affirming reasoning. Third, she ignores that
the character of a scientific community is subject to moral evaluation. We argue that
these omissions in Douglas’s theory leave it with no adequate response to TEDI
Syndrome. Along the way, we introduce motivations to take our alternative
approach, which we dub “active pluralism,” seriously.
First, in practice it is not so obvious that scientific fields are always communi-
cative communities of the sort required by Douglas. Recall that Douglas offers two
characteristics of scientists who make up these: they are “[a] in near constant
communication and [b] competition with other scientists.” Douglas presupposes
something like an efficient market in scientific ideas.11 Even if there are no barriers
to communication at all, any given scientist is exposed to a flood of information. So,
the mere fact that an issue is discussed openly in a scientific community is not
enough to ensure that any given scientist is aware of the discussion, let alone all the
relevant details of it.12
Moreover, policy-sciences do not always instantiate constant communication
and competition; there is plenty of classified (e.g., defense-related) or so-called
sponsored research that often is bound by non-disclosure requirements. This is not
an idle thought: financial trading houses try to keep their trading strategies and the
consequences of their proprietary financial products a secret for competitive advan-
tage – often these presuppose non-trivial technical and technological improvements
that will not be available and, thus, not well understood by the larger community,
including regulators and assessors of systemic risk. This issue generalizes more
widely; in medical sciences and engineering it is quite common to keep new
techniques secret by patenting first before publishing results. Some important
results never get published when the financial stakes are high.
Further, policy scientists, in particular, are not always transparent about the
explicit or subtler tacit financial incentives of their consulting work.13 Also, fields
11 For an influential statement of this idea within economics, see Stigler (1969). For recent critical
engagement see Schliesser (2011), and Boettke et al. (2010).
12We thank Neil Levy for pressing this point.
13The locus classicus is Gordon Tullock: “Not all of the advocates of tariffs, of course, are hired by
‘the interests.’ But the existence of people whose living does depend on finding arguments for
tariffs and the further existence of another group who think that maybe, sometime in the future,
they might need the assistance of either someone who believes in tariffs or an economist who is in
this racket makes it possible for them to continue to publish, even in quite respectable journals.
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have very diverging practices when it comes to replicating results or sharing data
(Feigenbaum and Levy 1993). There are well-known incentives and barriers against
publishing replications or dis-conformations. So even if scientific fields are essen-
tially communicative communities it is by no means obvious that scientific com-
munities communicate the right contents. It is unreasonable to expect Douglas’s
approach to apply without some finessing.
Our two other criticisms also focus on Douglas’s commitment to what can be
reasonably foreseen is linked to what is discussed and considered within the
scientific community. In both cases we highlight different problematic features of
her implicit commitment to efficiency in ideas within scientific communities. So,
our second criticism is that community standards are often the product of ongoing
scientific practices. In general, these practices are tuned to facilitate epistemic
practices not potentially moral implications of these practices or even the
unintended social impacts of these practices. To rephrase this point slightly in
economic terms: the incentives that govern the evolution of reasonably successful
epistemic norms need not have taken into account possible social and moral
externalities. For example, competent geneticists need not be well placed to foresee
or calculate the potential social costs of their mistakes or successes.14
This is not to deny that various policy sciences can have evolved in certain
directions in order to be attractive to policy-makers. For example, the mathematical
econometric techniques and tools – and more generally inferential technologies that
produce univocal and stable figures in calculating the implications of policy
alternatives – were promoted since the 1940s within economics, in part, because
they would make economists attractive as policy advisers (as opposed to say,
sociologists, lawyers, anthropologists, and historians).15 But it is not prima facie
obvious that attractiveness to policy makers automatically translates into being
socially responsible.
Be that as it may, in Douglas’s system it is the scientific community itself that
sets the benchmark for reasonable foreseeability. New findings are communicated
through conferences, journals, books, and so forth to peer-scientists. During this
contact (and the way it disseminates through graduate training and textbooks) a
community develops something of a benchmark for what a reasonable scientist
Thus a dispute which intellectually was settled over a century ago still continues.” The point
generalizes. Tullock ([1966] 2005): Chapter VII: The Backwardness of the Social Sciences.
14 In standard applied welfare economics distribution effects are ignored in calculating so-called
“consumer surplus,” but this means that some of the most controversial social consequences of
policy-advice is systematically neglected. See Harberger (1971), for an important defense, and
Khan (1992a) for criticism.
15This was also contested. See, for example the Koopmans-Vining debate; the papers are nicely
available here: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cp/p00a/p0029.pdf, accessed on May 16, 2011. We
thank Roger Backhouse for calling our attention to it. See also Harberger (1971). See also Du¨ppe
and Weintraub 2013.
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should foresee and how he or she should deliberate. If enough scientists adopt this
benchmark, it becomes the benchmark of the scientific community.16
The problem with this architecture is that there is a danger of self-affirming
reasoning. It is the individual scientist, as a member of the scientific community,
who determines the standard he or she will be judged by. Warnings of possible
consequences that do not make it into journals or conference presentations, or that
are not taken seriously by peer scientists, do not help shape the benchmark and are,
even if they turn out to be prescient, after all, therefore not taken into consideration
when blameworthiness (or praiseworthiness) of the scientific community is evalu-
ated. There is no need for conspiracies or malicious intent here. After all, time is
one of the scarcest commodities for active researchers; it is often not worth their
effort to actively seek out all consequences of a theory. Such an individual cost-
benefit analysis may well be replicated through a whole field. Moreover, if journal
articles in a field do not reward publications of, say, lack of replication then there
may well be incentives that prevent possible consequences from ever being
noticed.17 A socially significant question may never be asked in the pursuit of
interesting science. Again, to put this in economic terminology: competition for
scarce resources does not by itself guarantee that externalities are properly
incentivized.18
In practice, self-affirming benchmarks may well be woven into a field’s standard
practice. It is well known that alternative models and even long-standing objections
can get suppressed from a discipline’s collective tool-kit and memory. In the
philosophy of science literature, the suppression of long-standing objections or
even reliable alternative approaches is known as a “Kuhn-loss.”19 In particular,
insights of discarded theories that cannot be articulated or recognized by the new
theory are instances of Kuhn-losses.20 Here we use “suppression” in non-moral
sense; we have in mind epistemically important practices that set aside, say,
questions, anomalies, or results in pursuit of more epistemically promising alter-
natives. Kuhn is significant here for a related point. He helped popularize a view of
paradigms that allowed social-scientific practitioners to claim that they need not
16This need not be explicit; criticisms of a new benchmark my come to an end. See Pickering
(1992). In private correspondence Douglas insisted that on her view “it is not the case that what is
foreseeable is only what is discussed and considered.” The following goes beyond this point.
17Not all sciences have what we may label a Popperian ethos in which concepts, models, and
theories are deliberately constantly stress-tested. Plenty of sciences have what we may call a
confirming ethos; that is they seek to provide evidence for theories. For the sake of argument, we
stipulate that such a confirming ethos may be the most efficient epistemic practice.
18 See Ma¨ki (2011), who points out that the attainable truths may not necessarily track the truths
worth having. See also Schliesser (2005).
19According to I. Votsis (2011) the term “Kuhn-loss” seems to be coined by Heinz Post (1971).
20Hasok Chang (2004) offers ingenious arguments for the significance of Kuhn-losses, and he uses
these to motivate the pursuit of non-standard science. For extensions of the argument, see
Schliesser 2008, 2009.
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answer all objections; a welcome result in some consensus-aiming policy
sciences.21
So, the community standards themselves can be flawed for some (say)
non-epistemic purposes, but still be accepted by the community. That is to say,
the members of the community as well as their funders, grant agencies, and
“consumers” (i.e., politicians and the public) may well unintentionally create the
conditions by which a community instantiates the vice of close-mindedness and its
related vice of overconfidence. In such cases there is collective negligence. Often
the presence of TEDI syndrome is evidence that one is dealing with an instance of
collective negligence.22
We propose that if the benchmark is created by the scientific community itself,
there should at least be more to reasonableness than merely accepting the (vast)
majority’s opinion. In particular, if there is intolerance of alternative approaches
and suppression of historical knowledge of the discipline’s past (or the routine
propagation of mythic history in textbooks) these may well be enabling conditions
for collective negligence. Again, to put this in terms of Douglas’s implied efficiency
claim; there may well be institutional barriers to entry that prevent the kind of
intellectual competition worth having within a scientific community from society’s
point of view.
Collective negligence is not the only flaw in Douglas’s approach. Our third
criticism is this: it is perfectly possible that every individual scientist has acted
according to community standards, and therefore should be free of any moral
responsibility, but that there is a problem with those community standards. One
of those problems is that scientific communities seem to have difficulties to think
outside their paradigm and have limited tolerance of heterodoxy. Moreover, expert
over-confidence is a now well-established empirical fact (Angner 2006). To put this
in modal terms: There is a tendency for experts to treat their own model as
necessary.23 This tendency can be reduced if we treat the model as just one possible
world (or a member of a portfolio of theories).
The benchmark of foreseeability for any claim is often made within a “paradigm”
itself. Sometimes this means that events that are or were foreseeable within an
incommensurable paradigm become impossible to state within the ruling paradigm.
For example, in the tool-kit of recent mainstream economics it became very
difficult to talk about or even discern bubbles; the efficient market hypothesis
(understood in terms of random walks and arbitrage-free environments) makes no
conceptual space for it. When asked recently, “Many people would argue that, in
this case, the inefficiency was primarily in the credit markets, not the stock market –
21 Stigler 1975, pp. 3–4. We thank David Levy for calling our attention to it. Stigler was also an
active promoter of Kuhnian views about science within economics. For the larger story, see
Schliesser 2012.
22The desire to produce consensus may, in fact, sometimes be the distant cause of the negligence;
in such cases philosophies of science that promote an image of science as a consensus activity may
be thought complicit in the negligence.
23We thank David M. Levy for pressing this point.
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that there was a credit bubble that inflated and ultimately burst,” the economist that
actively promoted so-called efficient market theory, Eugene Fama, replied: “I don’t
even know what that means. People who get credit have to get it from somewhere.
Does a credit bubble mean that people save too much during that period? I don’t
know what a credit bubble means. I don’t even know what a bubble means. These
words have become popular. I don’t think they have any meaning”24 (emphasis
added).
Fama’s words here exhibit very nicely what we have in mind. His world-view is
so caught up with his evidentially well-supported, particular paradigm that he finds
concepts that do not fit it utterly unintelligible. To speak metaphorically: he sees
and understands economic phenomena through his model. Anybody that adopted
his toolkit – as was widely done among economists – could claim all scientists
within the community are free from any blame, because “everybody did it”. But, of
course, if he had wanted to, Fama could have learned about serious, empirical
studies of bubbles at the margins of the economics profession that seem to have no
problem operationalizing the term successfully.25
This concludes our critical engagement with Douglas. We now turn to sketch a
bit more fully our alternative approach that can promote a morally more sound
character to scientific communities and the duties of individuals within them.
14.3.2 The Duty of Epistemic Pluralism
In this section we explore the duties and obligations that prevent collective negli-
gence. The moral upshot of our analysis in the previous section can be articulated in
Douglas’s terms: the autonomy of a field with policy implications comes with
increased responsibility if not an outright duty to be open-minded, that is, to be
actively striving for a variety of pluralisms. For present purposes we adopt De
Langhe’s definition of pluralism, which is “an epistemic position which acknowl-
edges the validity of different possible perspectives on reality in an active way,
which means that they are not only tolerated but also taken into account when goals
of knowledge (prediction, problem-solving, truth, curiosity, policy advice, funding
decision, . . .) are to be achieved” (De Langhe 2009, p. 87).
We now turn to exploring briefly what this entails. In order to obtain scientific
pluralism it is not necessary that every individual scientist in a community is a
pluralist, but the scientific community as a whole should be. We cannot stress this
enough; we are tackling collective negligence at the level of the composition of the
24 http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/johncassidy/2010/01/interview-with-eugene-fama.html#ixzz1f
QoeflSE. See, for example, the canonical paper by Fama (1970), which has over 8,000 citations.
25 Including work done by those awarded the Nobel prize in economics. See Smith et al. (1988).
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community.26 From individual scientists we expect no more than ordinary, scien-
tific open-mindedness, this is why we focus on the character of the community. We
also focus on the responsibilities and duties of a sub-set of policy scientists those
involved in aggregating scientific knowledge.
At the community level we advocate the ongoing cultivation of competing,
potentially incommensurable paradigms. So, we reject the once-widespread idea
that a field’s unanimity is trumping evidence for it to be considered scientific or a
sign that a field is “mature” in Kuhn’s sense.27 We have in mind, of course, the
reality that in the wake of Kuhn’s Structure some fields of inquiry pursued near-
unanimity in order to be considered scientific. For example, the Nobel-laureate,
George Stigler defended this as a “fundamental tenet” of “those who believe in free
discussion that matters of fact and logic can (eventually) be agreed upon by
competent men of good will, that matters of taste cannot be.”28
In fact, there may well be many reasons that a science naturally becomes
pluralistic, if permitted.29 Diversity in science, while no magic cure, can help
ensure that a variety of research questions are asked and a corresponding variety
of possible solutions, problems and applications are discussed. This is a long-
standing concern of so-called standpoint theory that is very popular among femi-
nists philosopher of science and critical race theorists.30 To forestall misunder-
standing: we are not arguing that some standpoints are a priori better because they
are minority standpoints.
As an aside, while here we promote a pluralist approach at the level of the
composition of approaches within a scientific community, it is worth noting that it is
not the only possible way to avoid collective negligence. Given that even foresee-
able consequences may also have unintended side-effects, creating (incentives for)
a willingness to assertively articulate known or knowable uncertainty over possible
consequences of policy may be a viable alternative approach.31 Even if policy-
26Audiences to earlier drafts of this chapter worried that we demand a change of behavior in the
epistemic practices of individual scientists.
27 Some readers might wish to claim that our position has been decisively disproved in a famous
article by Robert J. Aumann 1976, “Agreeing to Disagree,”. But even if we grant the appropri-
ateness of his Bayesian conceptual apparatus, Aumann does not provide an institutional frame-
work that ensures that equilibrium in the information exchange will be reached such that rational
disagreement becomes impossible. Our approach offers reasons for thinking that the preconditions
that would make his proof actual for real scientific communities sometimes (often?) do not exist.
We thank M. Ali Khan for urging us to consider Aumann.
28 Stigler 1975, pp. 15–16. See Levy and Peart (2008). Stigler was an early, enthusiastic reader of
Kuhn; within economics it is common to encounter Kuhnian concepts (see Schliesser 2011 for
details).
29De Langhe 2009, p. 88. See also Kitcher 2001, pp. 55–62. Here we ignore the question of what
causes a lack of pluralism. When we presented this material to an audience of economists at NYU,
these proposed that government funding practices may be the source of monopoly power within
many sciences.
30 For an excellent introduction, see section “2. Feminist Standpoint Theory” in Anderson 2011.
31This is, in fact, the approach favored by one of the co-authors.
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makers may not wish to hear about uncertainty this does not exculpate the policy-
scientists who provide their “clients” with what they want to hear. Even indepen-
dent of our approach, scientists have professional duties that regardless of their
policy-makers’ wishes may demand fuller disclosure or remaining silent.32 This
aside suggest that a community can be morally responsible for the unintended and
unforeseen consequences of its research, namely if the community is not critical
enough such that it does not pay enough attention to the potential consequences of
the research. This means pluralism is not a necessary consequence of our criticism
of Douglas.
We claim that in order to avoid collective negligence at the policy level, having
different possible answers can help to make more responsible decisions. In the
active pluralism view promoted here, what is reasonable for a scientist is not what is
foreseeable according to the benchmark the majority has set, but it should be
evaluated in light of all the different (empirically well supported) perspectives
that are available in that discipline.33
Such evaluation is a requirement at the level where science and policy intersect.
In what follows we call that level the “aggregate level;” policy scientists that work
at an aggregate level do have special duties to seek out and be familiar with
scientific approaches other than their own and, perhaps, different from the ruling
paradigm(s). These duties follow from, in the first instance, from their ability to
influence policy. In practice such policy scientists working at the aggregate level
also gain special benefits from their status (e.g., recognition, access to lucrative
consulting gigs, etc.). This means that if a policy scientist chooses to ignore more
marginal voices within his or her discipline, this does not free him or her from
responsibility to take potential warnings from that group seriously to weigh the
consequences of possible error. There are known cases where, for example, in
development economics economists with “local” backgrounds pointed out the
biased assumptions of leading economists and were ignored.34
14.3.3 Some Distinctions
35
Our chapter challenges a widely held truism: (I) one can never be blamed for things
that were not foreseen (by you and your community). By contrast, our position is
32 Such professional duties have long been recognized by economists, including Alfred Marshall
and A.C. Harberger (1971).
33Boundary policing of a discipline makes it a bit tricky to say when such perspectives are still
available. Moreover, different theories may, of course, be differently empirically supported. But
even theories that are empirically less supported along many dimensions may do better in a sub-set
of problems.
34 See the criticism of Lawrence Summers by Khan 1992b, 1993 and the subsequent discussion by
Ron Jones in the same issue, pp. 580–582.
35This section is greatly indebted to [names omitted].
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that (II) a scientific community can be morally responsible/blameworthy for the
consequences of its research even if they are unintended and unforeseen in the
community. In particular, (III) a scientific community can be morally responsible or
blameworthy for the consequences of its research even if these are unintended and
unforeseen (by the community), namely if the broader community is not pluralistic
(such that it does not pay enough attention to the potential consequences of
research).
Of course, there is a closely related alternative to (I): (IV) One can never be
blamed for things that were not foreseeable. This is more appealing than (I); if
consequences of research are unforeseeable then one can never take them into
account, no matter how much attention one pays to them. Nevertheless, (IV) is
ambiguous between: (IV*) one is never to be blamed for things that were not
foreseeable by a community at the time; (IV**) one is never to be blamed for
things that were and are not foreseeable in principle, that is, genuine uncertainty.
Let’s grant (IV**) for the sake of argument (even if one can imagine cases where
not preparing for, say, any unexpected emergencies may be inexcusable).
Now, let’s operationalize the foreseeable in terms of the portfolio of models (and
paradigm-preserving extensions of these) within the paradigmatic science. In par-
ticular, the foreseeable is the possible in the paradigmatic models (plus bridge
principles, know-how of the expert, etc.). This suggests that (IV*) is too weak
because due to Kuhn-loss phenomena, paradigmatic models never incorporate all
the models available in discarded or non-paradigmatic models. So, a community
may in some circumstances not be able to foresee consequences that would have
been available if some of the non-paradigmatic models would be in use. So (V) a
community can be blamable for things that were not foreseeable (in the sense of
IV*) by a community at the time (because of overreliance on a ruling paradigm). In
fact, (V) is our argument for pluralism.
14.4 Active Pluralism as a Condition for Rationality/
Reasonableness
Before we offer some modest, preliminary suggestions on how to meet such duties,
we briefly characterize pluralism in epistemology in order to offer an account of
benchmarking that can avoid the vices of collective close-mindedness and collec-
tive negligence.
14.4.1 Pluralism in Epistemology
Pluralism in science is part of an ongoing debate, especially in epistemology. There
are philosophers who advocate pluralism in one specific issue of epistemology,
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such as explanation. Several philosophers36 advocate an explanatory pluralism, by
acknowledging that one can have different interests or types of questions, and thus
requiring a different type of explanation. But there are also philosophers who have
more expansive frameworks for articulating pluralism. For example, Mitchell and
Dietrich show how “integrative pluralism” succeeds in biology37; Van Bouwel
offers considerable motivation for pluralism in the social sciences and economics.38
In both cases, pluralism seems to be positively received, but “if it is to be more than
a liberal platitude, we need to delimitate more clearly”39 what pluralism entails,
where we want it and how we can achieve it. In the remainder of this subsection
we’ll dig deeper into the concept of pluralism.
Batens, Nickles, Nersessian and Schliesser40 defend pluralism as a key concept
in context-based epistemology.41 On this view, a belief or decision is only justified
if it is actively compared with available alternatives. This happens in a local
process, a context, since not all of our knowledge is used, doubted or accepted at
the same time. Accept this for the sake of argument. There are at least two important
features of this context-based proposal that raise questions. The first question is
what is considered an available alternative? This will be considered in Sect. 14.4.2.
The second worry is whether we can demand from an individual, policy scientist to
switch between views or hypotheses as if it were a change of clothes.
De Langhe (2009) addresses the second by making a useful distinction between
pluralism at the level of the individual scientist and at the level of the scientific
community. He argues that there are plenty of reasons to expect lack of consensus
in science: its presence can be the consequence of the problem of underdeter-
mination of theory by evidence (or data); the world’s complexity; the limits to
our cognition; the contingency thesis; experiential diversity and path dependence. If
an individual scientist accepts all alternatives simultaneously, his decisions (such as
research questions or methods) are empty. It could just as well have been another
decision. If he considers the multiple alternatives as a reason not to make a decision
at all, he would in a certain sense stop being a scientist.42 How does one make
choices as a pluralist, and how can those choices be warranted if there are multiple
36To ensure an anonymous referee process this sentence has been adapted. The original sentence
can be found on the title page.
37Mitchell and Dietrich (2006). It turns on recognizing different levels that need not require
general unification.
38Van Bouwel (in print) and Van Bouwel (2004, 2005).
39Keating and Della Porta 2010, p. S112.
40Batens (1974, 2004). There are other philosophers who advocate similar views, such as: Thomas
Nickles (1980) Nancy Nersessian (2008) and Eric Schliesser (2005).
41 For an interesting discussion about this form of contextualism, we refer to Demey
(forthcoming).
42This is what happened to the Chicago economist Frank Knight, who indirectly created the
foundations for an understanding of economics as an applied policy science as made famous by
“Chicago-economics” (e.g., Milton Friedman, George Stigler, A.C. Harberger, and Gary Becker),
but who himself was a deep pluralist about the way social science could influence policy and who
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views rationally justifiable? De Langhe points out that this is a false dilemma, since
it is not the individual scientist that needs to be a pluralist, it is the scientific
community. “Warranted choice can go hand in hand with pluralism on the condition
that pluralism is confined to the aggregate level. In other words, the cost of
warranted choice is individual level pluralism” (De Langhe 2009, p. 92). The
individual scientist qua scientist can continue doing research starting from his
situation, his epistemic interest, his experience, and so forth. This makes his or
her choices warranted at the individual level.
De Langhe infers that “advocates of pluralism should not bother trying to
convince individual scientists of adopting pluralism in their own research nor
blame them for not doing so” (p. 94). He advocates that it is far more important
to concentrate efforts to structuring scientific community in such a way that it
reflects the diversity at the community level. In particular, when scientific
knowledge gets aggregated for policy-makers (and regulators) this diversity should
be available. We have offered moral arguments for the same conclusion. We now
return to discuss the problem of benchmarking in order to assess the moral respon-
sibility of a scientific community and the duties of policy scientists within it.
14.4.2 Benchmarking in a Pluralist Epistemology
If a scientific community constitutes the benchmark by which the consequences of
its policy recommendations are to be judged then we argue that this community
should be pluralistic in a way that we characterize more exactly in this section. In
doing so we build on Batens’s proposal that reasonable decisions can only be made
after comparing a certain proposed action (claim or hypotheses, etc.) with available
alternatives (Batens 1974, 2004); we also agree with De Langhe’s proposal that
pluralism is only required at the aggregate level. By this aggregate level we mean
not just the composition and methods of the scientific community as a whole, but
also the manner in which these are deployed in policy advice. Here we focus on
some suggestions that can assure a supply of alternatives for the aggregate level.
We propose that an active pluralism can contribute to ensuring a morally respon-
sible scientific community.
Douglas refuses to separate the roles of a scientist-as-researcher from a science-
advisor (Douglas 2009, p. 82), but perhaps she would be inclined to accept De
Langhe’s distinction between the individual roles of a scientist (such as doing
research, writing articles, giving lectures), and the aggregate roles such as editing
a journal, organizing conferences, teaching, refereeing, policy-advisor, regulator,
media spokesperson, etc.43On that aggregate or composite level, De Langhe writes,
embraced (epistemic) uncertainty as a fact of life in most policy decisions. For a very good
discussion of Knight see Ross Emmett (2009), chapter 12.
43This distinction is in many respects a manner of degree, of course. A grant-making, lab-director
straddles our distinction for example.
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the effort should be focused on structuring scientific community in such a way that
it reflects the diversity at the individual level. Unfortunately he stops, where the real
problem begins.
We propose that scientists who work at the intersection with policy (understood
in its widest sense, including consulting, editorializing, regulating, etc.) take that
aggregate-responsibility seriously. Pluralism at the level of scientific content should
then be a value of paramount importance.44 Scientists who enter this level should be
prepared to question the current structure of the scientific community. In particular,
they have a duty to seek out alternative orientations within the scientific community
to their own approach. To forestall misunderstanding: even within this pluralist
framework we allow that many aggregating mechanisms (conferences, journals,
etc.) will not be and need not be in themselves pluralist. All we claim is that when
these mechanisms intersect directly or indirectly with policy that then policy
scientists and those that fund and listen to them have a duty to consider more
than one scientific perspective. Sometimes this can be as simple as letting, say, one
group of social scientists (say, sociologists) evaluate the policy advice of, say,
another group of social scientists (economists), or – recalling an earlier point –
geneticists. We agree with Douglas that it should still be scientists who judge
scientific claims.45
14.5 Conclusion
In the final paragraph of the section, our discussion has slid into practical sugges-
tions. In our conclusion we will offer a few more in order to stimulate further
reflection. For example, in grant-making or regulatory agencies one can try to
create distinct panels that ensure aggregate diversity and pluralism. This may
appear to make, say, the grant-process, or policy-advice generation less efficient
and messier. But we assume, by contrast, that scientific monocultures, which may
benefit from all kinds of economies of scale and internal efficiencies, can cause far
worse kinds of social externalities.46
In practice this means that grants should be awarded to economists, physicists or
psychologists of different positions, backgrounds, and so forth. We believe grant
agencies and ought to incentivize the presence of such alternatives. For example,
44There are other potential benefits to our proposal: if one paradigm bluntly fails, there are
alternatives available that can provide decent answers. Not to mention that scientific monocultures
may be vulnerable to extinction. So our proposal may increase the robustness of science. We thank
Dunja Seselja for pointing out this benefit.
45To forestall misunderstanding: an argument that all people affected by a policy decision should
be included in policy discussion falls beyond the scope of our more limited concern here.
46This is not just arm-chair philosophizing. Consider the massive damage done to environments
and indigenous people by large multinational lending institutions in the grip of one-sided eco-
nomics paradigms.
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10–25 % of a government research budget could be devoted to foundational and
methodological criticisms of dominant research programs; to ensure proper repli-
cation of fundamental results; to promote transparency of data; to do effectiveness
studies; to explore social consequences of policy; and to fund empirically or
conceptually promising alternatives to the main approaches. None of these sugges-
tions are radical and some would build on existing initiatives.47 Of course, there
would be plenty of resistance to such a proposal, too.
In public governance, and even in private companies, ombudspersons are
appointed to mediate between an organization and the interested stakeholders of
that organization. Plenty of institutions are capable of pursuing more than one
(perhaps hierarchically organized) goal at once. Something similar could be set up
within the policy sciences. Such an institution allows an individual scientist qua
scientist to focus on his or her research, while improving the moral character of the
scientific community. Moreover, such an institution can help the policy scientist
who is active on the aggregate level to cope with responsibilities that come with his
or her function.
Finally, our chapter challenges two deep-seated commitments in our thinking
about science. First, we deny that science ought to be characterized by unanimity of
belief among its competent practitioners. We have argued that this leads easily to
the vices of close-mindedness and expert-overconfidence. Second, we deny that the
current way in which research is organized is optimal if one wishes to prevent social
externalities; rather it seems especially prone to what we call TEDI Syndrome. We
advocate a reform of aggregate scientific institutions that promote active pluralism.
We also believe that given the great privileges and powers accorded to policy
scientists, it is their duty to seek this out.
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47 Some grant agencies already do this on a modest scale: The NSF’s “STS considers proposals for
scientific research into the interface between science (including engineering) or technology, and
society. STS researchers use diverse methods including social science, historical, and philosoph-
ical methods. Successful proposals will be transferrable (i.e., generate results that provide insights
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